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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
ESTATE REALTY, INC., a corporation,
Plaintiff-AppeUant,
vs.

Case No.
12896

WALTER W. KERSHAW,
Defendant-Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by appellant to recover a realtor's
commission and attorney's fees on a so-called earnest
money receipt and offer to puchase involving real estate.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
As originally instituted, the action was against respondent individually and as executor of the estate of
Dorothy W. Kershaw. The amended complaint (R. 1823) contained a first, second and third claim for relief.
At the commencement of the trial, appellant moved for
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the dismissal of its first and second claims. After trial of
the third claim for relief before the court, sitting without
a jury, the court entered its judgment in favor of respondent of no cause for action (R. 64-65).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant by its notice of appeal (R. 72) appeals to
this court from the judgment of no cause for action and
seeks reversal.
If appellant should prevail in this court on the theory
that there is a contract committing respondent to the
payment of a realtor's commission then there is a crossappeal to the effect that the contract is an unlawful price
fixing device and is void by reason of Section 50-1-6, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, which claim the trial court rejected (R. 70).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's statement of the facts is essentially correct except that it indulges in unsupported argument with
respect to Exhibit 4-D, a letter addressed to appellant
under date of June 19, 1968, by Willis L. Wright. The
letter states that at the time of the agreement sued upon
appellant failed to disclose that the property was in the
estate of Dorothy W. Kershaw, deceased, and subject to
probate. Mr. Wright was not made aware of the true fact
of ownership when he signed as a purchaser on the agreement sued upon. The letter points out title deficiencies
and problems with a right-of-way and states that Mr.
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Wright and his wife had been advised by counsel that
they had grounds to either rescind the earnest money
agreement of July 3, 1967, or secure damages in relation
to misrepresentations that induced the so-called purchase.
Independent of appellant a petition for an order confirming the sale of the property was filed in the District
Court of Salt Lake County on December 17, 1968, (Exhibit 6-D); paragraph 6 of the petition recites a sale, subject to the approval of the court, of the subject property
to Willis L. Wright and Afton W. Wright on a Uniform
Real Estate Contract reserving title in the executor until
the purchase money is paid. The contract provides for a
purchase price of $93,000.00 which is represented as being
at least 90 per cent of the appraised value thereof, the
property having been appraised within "the last 12
months" which would be December 17, 1967, and the contract providing for a down payment of $9,300.00 being 10
per cent of the of the purchase price. $8,060.00 of the
$9,300.00 down payment is to be applied to interest since
July 15, 1967, at 61h per cent per annum and $1,240.00
applied to principal, leaving an unpaid balance of $91,760.00. Mr. and Mrs. Wright admittedly took possession
of the subject property on July 15, 1967.
The order confirming the sale of the subject property
is dated the 31st day of December, 1968 (Exhibit 3-P).
The court by its order approved the petition for the sale
of the property on contract with Walter W. Kershaw as
the duly appointed and acting executor of the estate of
Dorothy Walker Kershaw designated therein as the seller.
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Neither appellant nor the respond(:mt sought approval of
the District Court for the payment of a commission.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT IS NOT
AN ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT AGAINST
RESPONDENT.
Exhibit "B" attached to appellant's amended complaint as the contract sued upon was introduced into evidence as Exhibit 2-P. The document is ambiguous and
meaningless in that, among other things, there was and
is no contracting party as "seller". The reference to the
commission is found in lines 49 and 50 and have reference
to the "seller" signing opposite the signature of the purchaser on lines 51 and 52. Lines 51 and 52 bear no signature and understandably for the reason that the owner
was deceased and there had been no proceedings in her
estate. There was no authority to bind the estate of Dorothy W. Kershaw and respondent did not purport to sign
as seller. The words "I Will Accept * * *" are meaningless, Dorothy W. Kershaw having admittedly died
seized and possessed of the property and there being no
pending probate proceedings.
In Case v. Ralph, 56 U. 243, 188 P. 640 (1920), it was
held that the broker did not and could not as a matter of
law earn the commission sought to be recovered unless
there is a contract by an authorized agent to sell or to
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procure a purchaser. The amount of comm1ss10n to be
paid must appear from the contract. A real estate broker
can only recover a commission upon some memorandum
in writing. By Section 25-5-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
every contract for the sale of lands shall be void unless
the contract is in writing, subscribed by the party by
whom the sale is to be made or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing.
Respondent by his answer (R. 37) alleged, and the
admitt9d facts in the case support without conflict that
on July 3, 1967, the date of the contract sued upon, the
appellant knew that the property was owned by Dorothy
\V. Kershaw at the time of her death and was subject to
probate. Furthermore, the complaint alleges that respondent at said time was not the duly authorized personal
representative of the deceased. It follows therefrom that
he had no authority to contract with reference thereto.
Under Section 25-5-4, Subdivision 5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and as reflected by Case v. Ralph, supra,
the broker in the position of appellant must allege and
prove an express contract of employment in pursuance
of which services were rendered which entitle him to recover his alleged commission. This court in Ney v. Harrison, 5 U. 2d 217, 299 P. 2d 1114, held that a handwritten
notation beneath the line requiring a commission equal
to the minimum fixed by the Salt Lake Real Estate Board
of "212 % which is Total Commission" satisfied the statute. In the instant case there is no provision, express or
implied, committing respondent to the payment of any
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amount in dollars or percentage. The amount of the commission is to be fixed by the Salt Lake Real Estate Board.
All respondent said was "I Will Accept * * *" and
he had no authority to do even this.
Appellant concedes that if respondent did anything
at all he made a counter proposal and then argues that
although Afton W. Wright, a joint purchaser with her
husband, did not expressly evidence her consent there was
evidence before the court to support a finding that Mr.
Wright in accepting respondent's counter offer was acting
"not only on his own behalf but as agent for his wife."
Mr. Wright testified that the document was not submitted
to Mrs. Wright for her signature following that of respondent and that she was in Salt Lake during the month of
July in 1967 (R. 104). Mr. Wright testified that his wife
was never requested to sign the instrument for the second
time (R. 107) . This falls far short of the contention of
agency in favor of Mr. Wright or even that his wife knew
of the so-called counter proposal.
Counsel correctly cites Capitol Electric Company v.
Campbell, 117 U. 454, 217 P. 2d 392 (1950), to the effect
that there must be some fact or circumstance in addition
to the marital relation and management of the wife's property by the husband before an agency of the husband
will be inferred.
In the instant matter the realtor not only ignored
Mrs. Wright but also ignored the legal effect of the property being subject to probate in the matter of the estate
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of Dorothy W. Kershaw, deceased, and that respondent
was unauthorized to commit the property for sale until
authorized by the District Court which event did not take
place until the month of December, 1968. Appellant begs
the question when arguing that a sale was sanctioned by
the probate court. The petition for the order for sale recites the names of beneficiaries and to whom notice would
have to be given before a contract could be even ent.ertained. Appellant must recover, if at all, within the four
corners of the contract sued upon, not the contract sanctioned by the probat.e court. Furthermore, appellant says
that the acceptance by Mr. Wright of the so-called counter offer gave rise to a valid binding contract to sell between the respondent and Willis L. Wright "thereby entitling plaintiff to payment of the real estate commission
as provided (in) the earnest money receipt." There was
no performance under the earnest money receipt sued
upon and appellant did not earn any commission with respect thereto.
The lett.er from Mr. Wright dated June 19, 1968,
(Exhibit 4-D) addressed to appellant protesting the difficulties with reference to the right-of-way, the lack of title,
subsequent proposals, count.er proposals with express reference to a document dated June 1, 1968, to say nothing
of the fact that the Wrights were unaware on July 3,
1967, that the property was in the estate of Dorothy
Kershaw belies the cont.ention of a valid contract under
which appellant could rightfully say that it had earned
a commission.
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The pros and cons of the protection of the landowner
from imposition of claims by real estate brokers and on
the other hand, the necessity of protecting the broker who
h'.ls rendered a bona fide service from being refused just
compensation for his work by the landowner are matters
of annotations in 80 A. L. R. 1456 and 65 A. L. R. 1423
referred to in Nye v. Harrison, supra. In the instant matter the real estate broker was clearly overreaching by the
earnest money receipt dated July 3, 1967, and upon which
it bases its action and it thereby lulled the Wrights into
an obvious situation exposing both sides to controversy
and claims of damages. In the instant matter there was
no contract binding upon either respondent or the Wrights
and there was no commission earned by appellant.
POINT II.
THE CONTRACT SUED UPON IS AN UNLAWFUL PRICE FIXING DEVICE.
This point involves respondent's cross appeal. Finding number 6 of the trial court (R. 69) and paragraph
1 of the conclusions of law (R. 70) are both to the effect
that the earnest money receipt wherein the "seller" is
obligated to pay a commission equal to the minimum required by the Salt Lake Board of Realtors is not in violation of Section 50-1-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Section 50-1-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, reads:
"Any combination by persons having for its object
or effort the controlling of the prices of any professional services, any products of the soil, any
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article of manufacture or commerce, or the cost of
exchange or transportation, is prohibited and declared unlawful."
It must be conceded that if the judgment of no cause
for action is to be sustained on the premise that the eames t money receipt did not present an enforceable agreement as between appellant and respondent by reason of
inherent infirmities including the rationale of the trial
court that respondent's signature constituted a counter
proposal which was not accepted by both of the alleged
buyers, then this point would be irrelevant and unnecessary for determination.
In Chumney v. Stott, 14 U. 2d 202, 381 P. 2d 84
(1963), Section 50-1-1, supra, as relating to listings on the
multiple listing board and the commission recommended
by the Salt Lake Real Estate Board was raised for the
first time on appeal and not presented to or discussed in
the court below. For that reason the court properly refused comment on the question of price fixing as affecting real estate brokers and the Salt Lake Real Estate
Board. We are not aware of any other Utah case that
even approaches the question as it relates to brokers and
the "seller" of real property under provisions as set forth
in lines 49 and 50 of Exhibit 2-P.
In United States of America v. National Association
of Real Estate Boards, 339 U. S. 485, 94 L. Ed. 1007
(1950), it was held that an association of real estate brokers in Washington, D. C. fixing standard rates of commissions constituted a conspiracy and restraint of trade in
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violation of the Federal Anti-trust Act. The critical question in the case was whether the business of a real estate
agent is included in the word "trade" within the meaning
of Section 3 of the Act. The Supreme Court of the United
States made the following statement:
"Members of the Washington Board are entrepre
neurs. Some are individual proprietors; others are
banks or corporations. Some may have no employees; others have large staffs. But each is in
business on his own. The fact that the business
involves the sale of personal services rather than
commodities does not take it out of the category
of 'trade' within the meaning of § 3 of the Act.
The Act was aimed at combinations organized
and directed to control of the market by suppression of competition 'in the marketing of goods and
services.'"
Appellant in the instant action quotes extensively on
page 15 from the dissenting opinion of Justice Jackson
as found in the above case where the dissenter takes the
position that the services of a real estate broker are
equated to some extent to those of "the lawyer, doctor
or office worker" and do not come within the connotation
of the word "trade". Our statute specifically condemns
any combination having for its object or effort the controlling of the prices "of any professional service". The
statute, we submit, would make it unlawful for any professional group to fix the fees of its members and would
come within the four corners of the majority holding as
well as the dissent of Justice Jackson, so far as realtors
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are concerned, as held in United States of America v.
National Association of Real Estate Boards, supra.
The question of the illegality of the contract sued
upon, if a contract at all, was specially raised by answer
to the amended complaint (R. 38) and the penalties for
not adhering to the fees recommended by the Salt Lake
Real Estate Board were developed in the testimony of the
witness Riddle (R. 89-90).
By asserting a cross appeal we do not want to be
understood as saying that the trial court was in error in
its conclusion and ultimate judgment that no contract
in law or in fact existed.
CONCLUSION
The contract sued upon was prepared by a layman.
The earnest money receipt is generally the basic document in real estate transactions and upon which specific
performance can be decreed in appropriate cases, but by
the same token the awkwardness of the lay individual in
the attempt to express the fundamental contractual concept has given rise and will continue to give rise to constant litigation, a mecca for the legal profession, but a
tragedy to those who have to expend their time and resources in that regard. The Wrights were not informed
when they were induced to sign the agreement as buyers
that the property was subject to probate in the matter
of the estate of Dorothy W. Kershaw, deceased. By the
same token, respondent in his individual capacity would
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have no recourse against the buyers and could not enforce
specific performance.
Appellant, by its amended complaint, paragraph 7
(R. 19) alleges that respondent "as executor did fail to
petition for an Order for the payment of a realtor's commission * * * and because of such failure to so petition, no Order for payment of a commission was made
by said court". The District Court has the authority to
approve the payment of a commission, but in the instant
matter that was not the burden of respondent. Appellant
should have acted in its own interest at the proper time
and under the proper circumstances. By its allegation,
attempting to place the burden on respondent, appellant
concedes that respondent in his individual capacity was
not the "seller" and that there was no contractual commitment on his part. The judgment appealed from should
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

GUSTIN & GUSTIN

Harley W. Gustin
Attorneys for Respondent

